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The Baltic states became the focus of attention as NATO, following its decision to 
accept new members, turned to the complex problem of defining its relationship with 
those states that want to join but would not be among the first to begin accession 
negotiations. In this context the Baltic states are in the unique position of being among 
the most vulnerable to Russian political, economic, and, potentially, military pressure at 
the same time that they are most closely linked, bilaterally and multilaterally, to the 
security and stability of the Northern European region and Europe as a whole.
The abstract idea of a link between Baltic and European security has concrete 
implications. In the years since Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania regained their 
independence they have become members of the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and 
the more recently created Council of Baltic Sea States. They have become Associate 
Members of the European Union and Associate Partners of the Western European 
Union (WEU), the military arm of the EU with links to NATO. They are participants in 
several NATO bodies, notably the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Aggression against the Baltic states would 
reverberate throughout these institutions. The network of bilateral political and economic 
relations that the Baltic states have forged with the United States as well as with Europe 
reinforces their cultural and historic identity with the West and lends substance to the 
Baltic-European security link.
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It is not the geographic proximity to Russia nor the existence of a large Russian 
population in Estonia and Latvia, the most often cited factors, that in themselves are 
threatening to Baltic security. The problem is rooted in two related aspects of Russian 
politics and policy. First, Russians continue to identify their loss of superpower status 
with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The recent declaration by the Duma that the 
dissolution of the Union was an illegal act is but one manifestation of what some 
observers refer to as a resurgence of "imperial" or "proto-imperial" ambitions.(1) It is not 
surprising that then-Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's statement that the Russian goal 
is "gradual reintegration" of the former Soviet Union on a "voluntary and equal" basis(2) 
was not reassuring to the Baltic states as they remained determined to be left un-
integrated.
Second, Russia's declared role as protector of Russian speakers in the "near abroad," 
however important in its domestic politics, has also been used as a means of exerting 
pressure on Estonia and Latvia. The Russian government has accused the two states 
not only of violating the human rights of their Russian-speaking population, but of 
engaging in "ethnic cleansing," planning "mass deportations" of Russians from Estonia 
and of forcing tens of thousands of Russians to leave Latvia.(3) Although some of the 
numerous international observer missions that have been invited to Estonia and Latvia 
have noted room for improvement, none has found evidence of massive or systematic 
human rights violations.(4) Nonetheless, throughout the years of negotiations over troop  
withdrawal--an estimated 200,000 Soviet/Russian troops were stationed in the capital 
cities of the three Baltic states and throughout their territories at the time of their 
renewed independence--Russia claimed that its military presence was needed to 
protect the Russian population in Latvia and Estonia. Similarly, Russia used allegations 
of human rights violations in an effort to block or delay Estonian and Latvian 
membership in the Council of Europe.(5) Most recently, Boris Yel'tsin sent a letter, 
characterized by one diplomat as "standard boilerplate," to President Clinton on the eve 
of the latter's meeting with the three Baltic presidents alleging mistreatment of Russians 
in Latvia and Estonia.
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When viewed in the light of Russia's new military doctrine, that includes vaguely defined 
conditions for intervention in the territory of the former Soviet republics, Russia's claim 
to a right to protect Russian speakers in the "near abroad" as well as a self-image of 
greatness that is linked to a restored Soviet Union assume a menacing aspect--one that 
has led the Baltic states to seek assiduously the security of NATO membership.
NATO, the United States, and Northern European states have responded to the Baltic 
search for security with a variety of proposals, programs, and plans that are intended to 
reassure them without granting them full membership in the organization. The 
fragmented bilateral and multilateral approaches reflect, at least in part, the lack of 
consensus within the alliance on how enlargement ought to proceed,(6) with even 
greater uncertainty regarding those states that will not be invited to begin negotiating 
their accession agreements at next year's NATO summit.
Under NATO auspices, the Baltic states, as well as the nearly two dozen other members 
of the PfP program--including Russia, all former Soviet republics, all former members of 
the Warsaw Pact, and two European neutrals, Sweden and Finland--are offered a new 
or enhanced PfP or "PfP Plus." Aside from allowing NATO to postpone the decision on 
which states to admit as full members of the alliance, PfP was intended, among other 
things, to assist those states that sought membership to meet the organization's criteria. 
PfP offered participation in NATO's military exercises and encouraged strengthening 
civilian control over military forces as well as democratization in general.(7) Perhaps 
most important, the program facilitated the development of compatibility with NATO--as 
one Estonian officer put it, to "learn the NATO alphabet."
Although the PfP Plus is still to be completed, the Baltic states consider it as a poor 
substitute for NATO membership. As with the PfP, they are concerned that the new 
version is intended to defer indefinitely an invitation to join the alliance.
Speaking to the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki at the beginning of September, Carl Bildt 
proposed the establishment of a Northern European Partnership for Peace (NEPfP). 
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Based on his experience with multilateral NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, his 
plan would unite Baltic and Nordic countries in a network of military and other 
cooperation. Working within the broader framework of NATO security cooperation, the 
NEPfP would prevent, Bildt argued, the Baltic Sea region from becoming a power 
vacuum in the process of NATO enlargement. More to the point, the NEPfP would 
counter the effect of the new relationship with Russia that is to be established as part of 
the NATO enlargement process--politically, Russia would be closer to NATO than 
Sweden or Finland.(8)
The proposal was rejected quickly and emphatically by Sweden's Prime Minister Goran 
Persson. His own initiative, introduced a month earlier, stressed the need for an 
expanded dialogue with Russia, "taking into account its historic interest in the Baltic 
region." His proposed Baltic Sea Cooperation Council, although introduced as a means 
of enhancing Baltic regional security, focuses primarily on problems of migration, crime, 
and the narcotics trade.(9)
Although Bildt's proposal appears to be more consistent with the Clinton 
administration's emphasis on regionally focused PfP Plus programs, it was the more 
"neutral" Baltic Sea Cooperation Council that received the president's endorsement 
when Persson visited the White House in August 1996.
The US administration's own approach, aside from its active encouragement and 
support of the PfP Plus and various bilateral arrangements between the Baltic states 
and other European countries--for example, the Polish-Lithuanian and Polish-Latvian 
initiatives for military cooperation and the mentoring arrangements between Nordic 
countries and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the context of NATO peacekeeping in 
Bosnia--centers on the Baltic Action Plan (BAP) and Charter. Introduced to the Baltic 
ambassadors by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott at the end of August 1996, 
the BAP is intended to convey the idea that the United States has a serious interest in 
the security of the Baltic states. Although the administration sought to avoid creating the 
impression that the BAP was a "consolation prize" for not being included in the first 
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round of NATO enlargement, it is a work-in-progress the completion of which is to 
coincide roughly with the expected announcement naming those states that are to be 
invited to begin accession negotiations.
Underscoring the significance it attaches to the plan, the administration dispatched a 
multi-agency delegation headed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
European and Canadian Affairs, Marshall Adair, on a tour of Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius to 
brief and solicit views from all three Baltic governments. Based on a three-track 
approach, the BAP focuses on: a) helping the Baltic states to prepare for integration into 
multilateral and regional institutions; b) encouraging an improvement in relations 
between Russia and the Baltic states; and c) strengthening the US-Baltic bilateral 
relationship.
The first part is essentially a summary of already existing programs and will vary in 
detail to reflect differences among the three Baltic states. The second part is an 
expression of US willingness to facilitate contacts between Russian and Baltic officials. 
The third, and what the Baltic states consider the most important, part of the BAP 
envisions signing a charter on US cooperation with the Baltic states. It is in the charter 
that two important points could be given substance: Adair's assurance that Clinton has 
"resolved to support the shaping of Baltic regional security" and that the door to NATO 
"will always stay open."(10)
Although initially the Baltic states responded unilaterally to the administration's invitation 
to submit observations and suggestions for the BAP--the Foreign Ministry of Latvia 
submitted a detailed twelve-point recommendation--toward the end of November 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania agreed on a joint "food for thought" proposal. Several 
events led up to the agreement on a common text. First, the BAP, especially since it 
included the charter idea that would be signed by all three, required a consensus 
among the Baltic states. Second, in response to US Secretary of Defense William 
Perry's statement on 27 September 1996, the President of Estonia Lennart Meri, 
Latvia's President Guntis Ulmanis, and the President of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas, 
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issued a statement that pledged, among other things, a joint approach in their effort to 
seek NATO membership.
Secretary of Defense Perry, in an address to a meeting of Northern European and Baltic 
defense ministers in Copenhagen, stated that while the Baltic states were "not yet" 
ready to fulfill the collective security obligations (Article V) of NATO membership, they 
"are making very good progress in that direction" and "we should all work to hasten the 
day that they will be ready for membership."(11) What reverberated through the capitals 
of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, however, was the "not yet" expression that Perry used 
in his press conference. That the Baltic states were not being considered for admission 
in the first phase on NATO enlargement could not have been a surprise; however, the 
naming of the three states was unwelcome and unexpected. The report galvanized the 
Baltic presidents to issue a statement that stressed, in considerably less general terms 
than in previous statements, their joint commitment to seek "peace and friendship with 
all our neighbors" while seeking to "provide for our security both through our own efforts 
and through membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." Perhaps more 
important, the presidents made a pledge: "[W]e commit ourselves and our peoples to 
the sacrifices necessary to upgrade our defense forces to bring them into line with 
NATO standards."(12) The statement was an obvious acknowledgment of the 
substantive accuracy of the "not" and a hopeful emphasis on the "yet."
Finally, the joint paper was prepared in response to what had become clear: The Baltic 
states had not mustered sufficient support among NATO members to be invited to join 
the alliance in 1997. There was, however, a consensus among the allies on the need to 
avoid undermining the security of the Baltic states without admitting them to full NATO 
membership. In effect, NATO as well as Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were in search of 
an approach, a formula that would reflect that consensus. The conversations between 
Baltic diplomats and Pentagon and other officials in Washington and in European 
capitals revolved, to a great extent, around a RAND study addressing precisely this 
issue.(13) In the course of these discussions Baltic policy makers gained a sense of 
what might be desirable and what might be feasible in the face of NATO enlargement.
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Short of NATO membership, the Baltic States want to avoid the establishment of a 
dividing line between themselves and states that will be invited to begin accession talks 
in 1997. They have been arguing that a phased NATO enlargement would have 
precisely this effect--with predictably dire consequences. It would create a Korea 
syndrome with the Baltic countries left outside the Western sphere of interest, 
encouraging Russian ambitions in the Baltic region. It also would undermine the political 
argument, and political leaders, in favor of further economic, political, and military 
reforms undertaken, to a great extent, as part of the Baltic States' pursuit of integration 
into European economic and security institutions.
Their suggested solution, however, for NATO to invite all states that are eligible in 
principle to begin the accession process together while staggering the actual admission,
(14) has not received much support. The central objection is that an invitation to begin 
talks on accession would be a commitment to accept the state for admission. Most 
NATO members are not prepared to make such a commitment. They prefer the more 
indefinite approach of the Partnership for Peace Plus.
In their joint paper the Baltic states address the objection only partially. They point out 
that while an enhanced PfP would contribute to security in Europe, it would not address 
the core of their security problem, the dividing line. But to avoid rendering the invitation 
to accession meaningless--if it were extended to all possible candidates, whether they 
are strongly committed to join or not--or to commit the alliance to a specific date for 
admission (1999 is the year proposed for the first phase of NATO enlargement) the 
paper proposes the decidedly un-soundbite solution of "Differentiation Based on Self-
Differentiation."
States, to be referred to as "European democracies sharing the basic values of the 
Alliance," would be placed in a separate category of countries that would be 
distinguished from other PfP Plus participants on the basis of their "Self-differentiation." 
The differentiation would be based on the facts that they have made clear their wish to 
gain full NATO membership and that they are making significant progress toward that 
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goal. This approach would distinguish clearly the Baltic states from the members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, most importantly Russia, and serve as a 
recognition of their special status in relation to NATO, a status they want formally 
recognized. They would be designated as "Applicant Partners" and regarded as "prime 
candidates for future membership." The paper proposes that at the forthcoming NATO 
summit an "Atlantic Accord" would be signed with the Applicant Partners that would be 
named and with whom the alliance would begin preparatory negotiations "with a view of 
their future membership." Finally, to ensure that the "Atlantic Accord" would not remain a 
paper-reality only, they request that the progress of the preparatory negotiations be 
reviewed at North Atlantic Council meetings and special review conferences.
What the proposal does not request is either the start of accession negotiations with all 
potential members at the same time or a specific date by which the "preparatory 
negotiations about enlargement" should be completed. In effect, the Baltic states want 
NATO to establish an ongoing process regarding their accession without asking for a 
definite commitment on the timing for the beginning of accession negotiations. This, 
essentially, is the approach to Baltic Security that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania want 
the December NATO ministerial meeting to consider and forward to the 1997 summit 
conference.
What choices and commitments NATO makes at the summit will influence strongly how 
effectively the allies will be able to carry out NATO enlargement without undermining 
Baltic state and regional security.
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